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Introduction 
Naoki Kasuga 
Hitotsubashi University 
The papers in this volume were originally presented at Symposium The Human 
and the Social, 7 December 2010, Tokyo. The theme of the symposium—the 
human and the social—are pivotal to the ontological turn in anthropology that has 
been gaining ground since the 1990s. Human and larger social entities, the two 
protagonists of this discipline, are no longer what they used to be. Observers are 
reluctant to consider them as undeniable objects, given realities susceptible to 
simple observation, description, and analysis. These days we start by 
reconsidering what these things might be. Could they be merely a bundle of 
effects caused by some combination of or linkages between various other things, 
living or non-living, tangible or intangible? The question of the human and the 
social is now a central concern in anthropology, a question to be elaborated by 
tracing how the human and the social are enacted by other things. Anthropologists 
seek to characterize actors, agency, networks, assemblages, and other nodes and 
forces in open-ended generative matrices. 
The old protagonists still survive, however, albeit in a changed form, not 
as nouns, but as adjectives. Today’s anthropologists want to find out how things 
referred to as human or social come to be evoked and substantialized. And 
subsequently to consider the extent to which these evocations and 
substantializations can be universalized. What are the limits of universalization? 
And why do different effects occur? In this sense, the human and the social 
remain the core concerns of anthropology. However, while the social has been 
widely discussed in many other disciplines, the concept of ‘human’ has been less 
seriously reconsidered. Following a trend since the dawn of institutionalized 
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social studies, social scientists still tend to argue that the society in which they 
live is becoming less and less social. All the while, they ensure their raison d’être 
by locating this embarrassing situation in a field formed around the unshaken 
concept ‘society’. Individualized or psychologicalized though it may now be, 
society remains a key term of reference. Attached as it is to a less abstract form, 
the concept ‘human’ tends to be more taken for granted and is less often called 
into question. While decreasing sociality is lamented as normal, lapses in 
humanity are aberrant when excusable, and abhorrent when not. The rootedness of 
the concept of the human can be seen in universally accepted ‘human rights’ 
sanctioned by the United Nations. This notion could be explored in terms of 
possessive individualism or of implicit introduction of entitlement to be human, 
but few have begun to grapple with such issues. 
If changes in notions of the social are inextricably related to changes in 
notions of the human, one of the virtues of anthropology is that it has 
simultaneously developed and refined the study of both the human and the social. 
Here great advances were made by Marily Strathern and Bruno Latour, 
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. In quite different ways, they both radically 
questioned the validity of the related concepts, ‘human’ and ‘society’. When 
Strathern presented Melanesian gift-exchange, she describes as as-if found objects 
and shows no determinate social or human forms. Instead, she shows personhood 
as always in the process of being divided, aggregated, and transformed through 
enchainment with heterogeneous elements. Meanwhile, Latour focusing on so-
called Western intellectual traditions, has argued that the modern, characterized 
by a belief in the separation of subject and object, human and non-human, and 
nature and society has never been tenable. Because we have never been modern, 
we are neither human nor social in the ways we believe we are. 
The elucidation of Strathern and Latour, their reconsideration of the 
human and the social, was only part of tremendous upsurge of questioning 
classical ways of understanding the universe. To borrow a passage of Viveiros de 
Castro (2010) in Deleuzian Intersections: 
The ancient premise of the ontological discontinuity between language and 
the world, which assured the reality of the former and the intelligibility of 
the latter (and vice versa) and that served as ground and pretext for so 
many other discontinuities and exclusions—those between myth and 
philosophy, magic and science, primitive and civilized, for example—
seems to be in the throes of metaphysical obsolescence. (221) 
It is this drastic collapse of the distinction between language and world, 
epistemology and ontology, that forced Strathern to pioneer her complicated style 
of writing, and impelled Latour to so persevere with tracing networks of 
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practicing scientists. These days, Strathern’s approach is characterized as ‘lateral 
flection’ or ‘fractal analogy’ and Latour’s as ‘flat ontology’. Their work, part of a 
general change that is widely occurring in ways appropriate to various disciplines, 
makes us wonder how to draw boundaries and focus on specific areas. How do we 
select keywords? How do we specify topics for discussion? Can worthwhile 
discoveries be made without doing these things? 
By delimiting, specifying, and defining the subject, we increase the risk of 
fogging arguments that seek to elucidate relationships between language and the 
world. Just how well can words represent the phenomena they label or describe? How 
well do categorical ordering and typological thinking provide us with proper ideas of 
reality? These seemingly philosophical concerns are now questions of general interest. 
Observers have become increasingly suspicious of viewpoints: since no identity, 
never mind hierarchies, can be ensured, transcendental detachment is not possible. 
Whereas, in the past, deviations from fixed order were noted as the unexpected, 
today’s observers tend to see ceaseless ruptures. Yesterday’s manageable schema are 
today’s problematic propositions. The more things are explored in this way, the more 
multiple, elusive, and divergent they turn out to be. Dialectics, convergence, and 
monistical necessity become dubious. This does not mean that the pursuit of the 
universal has been abandoned. Far from it: these days the universal is sought in the 
form of becoming rather than being, in specific process rather than in a given 
condition, as partial aspects rather than complete entities, in problems rather than in 
resolutions. Our symposium was intended to further advance these explorations. 
Making our papers juxtaposed, we sought and appreciated partial connection. We 
enjoyed the flavor of incongruence and, to realize the potential for better 
understanding, we intentionally activated the imagination. 
Let me conclude this Introduction with an example of this kind of 
imagination in practice. You may already be familiar with Elizabeth Costello, an 
unforgettable character created by Nobel Laureate J. M. Coetzee. If not, imagine 
an aged female writer who is invited to a memorial lecture at Princeton University, 
where her son coincidentally teaches physics. She knows she is difficult to please, 
and well aware that her words and deeds tend to drive people into a corner, 
making them uneasy, leading to unpleasant encounters. She delivers a lecture 
called ‘The Lives of Animals’ in which she says: “I know how talk of this kind 
polarizes people, and cheap point-scoring only makes it worse” (Coetzee 2001:22). 
The kind of talk she refers to is an analogy which she repeatedly draws between 
the way her fellow humans treat animals, especially at slaughterhouses, and way 
the Third Reich treated Jews. Of the Nazis she says, “By treating fellow human 
beings like beasts, they had themselves become beasts”. Continuing, “We are 
surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals 
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anything that the Third Reich was capable of” (21). The lecture caused a tense 
atmosphere that lasted until the formal dinner was over. The following day she 
received a letter from a Jewish poet who did not show up to dine with her. 
Showing his respect to this female writer, the poet logically pointed out Costello’s 
misunderstanding of analogy: 
If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are treated 
like Jews. The inversion insults the memory of the dead. It also trades on 
the horrors of the camps in a cheap way (50). 
Costello attended two seminars next day, where she persisted in bluntly talking 
about the same topic. On the way to the airport with her son, who has been on 
edge during her stay, she hears him apologize for the uncomfortable attitude of his 
wife. Watching the wipers wagging back and forth, Costello suddenly opens up: 
“I no longer know where I am”. Everyday, it is apparent that the people around 
her eat animals, yet she also sees human kindness in the eyes of these carnivores. 
She imagines going into the bathroom of friends and seeing a soap-wrapper that 
says, “Treblinka — 100% human stearate”. She cannot resolve this apparent 
contradiction, and Coetzee offers no solution. The scene ends with her confessing 
that all she can do is say, “Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain 
out of a molehill. This is life. Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t 
you? Why can’t you?” Whereupon her son stops the car, hugs his mother, and 
consoles her with ambiguous words: “There, there, it will be soon over” (69). 
The point of outlining this story is not to problematize the human but to 
characterize the nature of Costello’s anguish and to examine why, to use her own 
phrasing, she can’t come to terms with it. Logically, this may be explained by the 
analogy she uses. Analogy is a typical means by which we link the abstract and 
imageless to the world of appearance and render it thinkable. The Jewish poet’s 
criticism implies that the reversible format of Aristotle’s equation does not hold. 
In fact, irreversibility maintains separation in the analogy: it keeps the referents 
apart and asymmetrically related. In this way, the terms of both can be 
accommodated in a similar way that linear equations resolve different variables. 
Each side of the analogy has its own solution. Yes, classifying people as less than 
human and treating them like cattle is horrifying. But, if the treatment of cattle is 
horrifying, it is horrifying in a different way. These two solutions, horror A and 
horror B, can be naturally combined together and put in an additive single form 
(i.e., a solution as horror A+ horror B). Costello is hopelessly trapped by a 
different equation. She confesses that her unusual analogy sticks in her mind and 
haunts her (i.e., no solution as horror A→horror B + horror B→horror A). 
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How does she come to be so strongly convinced that the analogy is 
reversible? Coetzee scatters hints she willingly brings herself to this moral 
impasse. My favorite is Costello saying:  
I don’t know what I think, I often wonder what thinking is, what 
understanding is. Do we really understand the universe better than 
animals do? Understanding a thing often looks to me like playing with 
one of those Rubik cubes. Once you have made all the little bricks snap 
into place, hey presto, you understand. It makes sense if you live inside 
a Rubik cube, but if you don’t […] (45) 
Costello suggests that if we don’t live in the world of linear equations, the truth 
must be found in nonlinear equations. The mathematical difference between the 
two, according to M. DeLanda, ‘is explained in terms of the superposition 
principle, which states that given two different solutions of a linear equation, their 
sum is also a valid solution’ (2005:185). But for nonlinear equations, a change in 
the value of one variable does not produce a constant or proportional change in 
the value of related variables. Rather, even though the relationship is deterministic, 
the relationship between variables is itself variable in unpredictable ways and 
equations remain unsolvable. Costello would not remove herself from a situation 
that was not conducive to stable relations and formulary treatment. 
The authors in this volume must be very much in sympathy with Elizabeth 
Costello. Determined to face the unsolvable, the unpredictable, and the 
problematic, as she does, they keep aloof from the superposition principle and 
additive resolutions. However, unlike her, they already share abysmal perplexities. 
Even when confronted by the most dismal issues, for example, coming to terms 
with shipping people to extermination camps with less regard for them than if 
they were cattle, it is fascinating to approach the truth by viewing the situation in 
various ways to find out more, however terrible, about what constitutes the human 
and the social. 
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